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Institutional Logics and Critique in German Academic
Science. Studying the Merger of the Karlsruhe        
Institute of Technology
Insa Pruisken ∗ 
Abstract: »Institutionelle Logiken und Kritik im deutschen Feld der Wissen-
schaft. Eine Untersuchung des Fusionsprozesses des Karlsruher Instituts für 
Technologie«. This contribution looks into changing institutional logics in the 
field of academic science in Germany using the case of the merger between the 
University of Karlsruhe and the Research Center Karlsruhe as an example. As a 
result of an ongoing process of critique, a new institutional logic of “organiza-
tional competition” was theorized over time that contradicted the dominant 
logic of “corporatist planning.” The conditions for the merger case were 1) an 
increasing alignment and cooperation between both organizations as an out-
come of the public critique of big science research institutes, and 2) the rise of 
a new institutional logic of organizational competition including the organiza-
tional implementation of a new management model of science, notably the 
concept of the "entrepreneurial university" (e.g. the MIT in the United States). 
After the merger had been decided, political activities shifted from a projective 
"mode of theorization" to a pragmatic "mode of negotiation." The institutional-
ization of the new "Karlsruhe Institute of Technology" (KIT) was shaped by two 
competing logics: Whereas the state and the Helmholtz Society did not want to 
lose their influence, the new KIT was committed to the concept of the "entrepre-
neurial university" and thus to a higher degree of organizational autonomy and 
strategic management. The final outcome was a compromise built on a layered 
structure that combined pre-existing and new organizational structures. 
Keywords: Institutional logics, critique, theorization, merger, higher education, 
sociology of science, organizational change. 
1.  Introduction  
Many scholars studying academic institutions claim that marketization seems 
to turn universities and research organizations into strategic corporate actors 
with a high degree of organizational autonomy, competing for students, re-
                                                             
∗  Insa Pruisken, Department of Social Sciences, Economics, and Business Administration, 
University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstraße 21, 96045 Bamberg, Germany; 
insa.pruisken@uni-bamberg.de. 
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source funds, and recognition (Slaughter and Rhoades 2004; Krücken and 
Meier 2006). The German academic system has been typically described as a 
latecomer in that process (Schimank and Lange 2009). The reasons for this 
time lag are usually attributed to the high degree of multilevel governance and 
strong academic self-administration in the German science system (Hornbostel 
2001; Knie and Simon 2010). From a governance perspective, this institutional 
change results from intended and unintended effects of research performance 
and academic autonomy (Jansen 2010a; Whitley, Gläser and Engwall 2010; 
Boer, Enders and Schimank 2007; Münch 2006).  
In contrast to the governance perspective, the institutional logics approach 
takes into consideration that multiple rationalities may compete within a field, 
especially in unsettled periods of turbulent change. The term institutional logic 
refers to the cultural models and organizing principles that define how re-
sources, organizations, and individuals are ordered in a focal field of study 
(Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012). Two competing institutional logics 
characterize the academic scientific field in Germany: Firstly, the institutional 
logic of corporatist planning emerged after World War II in order to handle the 
massive expansion of higher education, on the one hand, and organize nuclear 
research, on the other hand. This logic was driven by the insight that education 
and science are crucial for economic success and prosperity. It involved a high 
degree of labor division and segmentation in both the university and the non-
university sector. Over the past decades, this institutional order has increasingly 
come under pressure by the growing influence of an institutional logic of or-
ganizational competition. This logic shifts the focus to the organizational level 
of universities. They are seen as the primary locus of managing the relation-
ships between researchers, industry, governments, and students. The question 
arising from this schematic description is: Why has the institutional logic of 
corporatist planning shifted to the logic of organizational competition? Put 
differently, how did the principles of competition, quality, and transparency, 
which were articulated in the discourse, become relevant for action?  
In order to understand this shift in institutional logics in the academic field, 
this contribution builds on a single case study, namely the merger of the Tech-
nical University of Karlsruhe and the Research Center Karlsruhe (member of 
the Helmholtz society). In the course of the first round of the so-called German 
Excellence Initiative, both organizations established together the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology (KIT). From the perspective of the “old” logic of cor-
poratist planning, this merger is a deviant case (Rueschemeyer 2008) that many 
observers had estimated to be highly unlikely and unique. Whereas universities 
are financed and regulated by the German federal states, the research institutes 
of the Helmholtz society mostly (90%) depend on the national government. A 
merger of two differently regulated and funded organizations seems to be high-
ly complicated and very difficult to realize. This case can only be understood 
within the new logic of organizational competition: The KIT was the result of a 
HSR 42 (2017) 3  │  220 
voluntary merger1 initiated by the two organizations themselves in the course 
of the first round of the German Excellence Initiative. It was even designed in 
order to overcome the high degree of segmentation within the academic field. 
The second research question that arises from the case study is how the two 
competing logics have influenced the merger process. What are the conse-
quences of this organizational change? 
This paper is subdivided into five parts: The first part develops a theoretical 
model for the analysis of institutional logics in academic science. The second 
part introduces the methodology of process-tracing. The qualitative analysis of 
the process is analytically structured by two theoretical constructs: critical 
junctures and critique. The third part presents the changing institutional logics 
in German academic science from a field perspective. The fourth part studies 
the decision and outcome of the KIT merger process. The fifth part draws some 
conclusions concerning the role of critique for the emergence of institutional 
logics. 
2.  The Institutional Structures of Academic Science 
From the macro-sociological perspective of differentiation theory, science, econ-
omy, politics, or religion are viewed as “societal subsystems” or “value spheres” 
(Weber) where each sphere is dominated by its own “rationality” such as profit 
seeking (economy), striving for power (politics), and striving for salvation (reli-
gion) (Schimank 2015, 84). In this sense, the scientific subsystem provides the 
norms and values that define the scientific ethos of “truth.” Earlier studies 
stressed the institutional prerequisites (such as universalism, communism, disin-
terestedness, and organized skepticism) for the autonomy of science (Merton 
1974). Accordingly, the dynamic of the science system is shaped by a “functional 
antagonism” that confronts the self-referential orientation towards “curiositas” 
with expectations from politics and society (Schimank 2015, 89). Differentiation 
theories maintain that the scientific value sphere is structured by a conflict over 
the question whether and how external or self-referential aspects of the produc-
tion of services and goods should be considered (Schimank 2015, 83).  
This institutional paradigm of the sociology of science has been criticized by 
the microsociological approach which argues that the  
Mertonian norms […] are formulated at such a general level that they appear 
to be common to the whole academic community. They are, therefore, open to 
great variety of interpretations. (Mulkay 1977, 105) 
                                                             
1  Over the last forty years, several German universities and smaller institutions had merged, 
but these mergers were initiated or even forced by the Länder (federal states) governments 
mostly for rationality and efficiency reasons (Pruisken 2014).  
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A major insight devolved from this research agenda to the sociology of science is 
the cultural “disunity of the sciences“ (Knorr Cetina 2009, 2): The behavior of 
scientists is much more determined by disciplinary differences and epistemic 
cultures than by subsystem-specific norms and rationalities (Knorr Cetina 1992). 
If scientists are always truth-seeking, skeptical, and disinterested people, how is 
resistance towards innovation and new knowledge possible (Mulkay 1969)? 
Consequently, the process of scientific knowledge production should be con-
ceived as underdetermined and contingent: “There are no absolute – and at least 
no empirical – criteria that decide whether a hypothesis is true or not” (Heintz 
1993, own translation).  
What can be concluded from both contradicting paradigms is that the scientific 
value sphere, on the one hand, and research practices, on the other hand, are 
mediated by a wide range of structures at the meso-level. “Scientific truth” is a 
value and therefore a rather metaphysical category that can only be “phenome-
nalized through practice” (Friedland et al. 2014, 335). What makes science dis-
tinctive from other social areas are the discipline-specific measures and proce-
dures that ensure scientific quality (Weingart 2010, 124). Against this backdrop, 
three kinds of intermediating structures can be compared 1) disciplines, 2) scien-
tific communities, and 3) organizations. These institutional elements specify the 
ways and strategies of how scientific quality or excellence can be reached (La-
mont 2009). Disciplines are “the primary unit of internal differentiation of the 
modern system of science” (Stichweh 1992, 4). They are institutionalized at 
universities (as roles of professors and departments) and within academic profes-
sional associations. Disciplines may embrace several scientific paradigms shared 
by scientific communities (Kuhn 1972; Stichweh 1992). 
Finally, scientists work in and are influenced by various forms of organiza-
tions (universities, research institutes, funding agencies) that organize, control, 
direct, fund, and regulate research activities in many ways (Braun 1993). Their 
research is also financially dependent on external givers (state, economy, civil 
society) and therefore relies on additional sources of legitimation (Schwinn 2009, 
58). In particular, nation states have started to found organizations and programs 
to realize their goals and ideas since the 20th century (Stichweh 2013, 138). As 
comparative studies have further shown, the entanglement of scientific disci-
plines, communities, organizations, and the state differs considerably from one 
country to another.  
The concept of institutional logics grasps the link between narratives (Elzinga 
2012), self-descriptions (Kaldewey 2013), or “imaginaries” (Jasanoff and Kim 
2009) and action-oriented “scripts” that guide the attention at the level of research 
groups, university presidents, or science managers and captures how values, 
practices, and regulatory rules are interrelated. Thornton and Ocasio define insti-
tutional logics as  
the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their 
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material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
social reality. (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 804) 
In the field of academic science, institutional logics define how academic re-
searchers, instruments, scientific practices, organizations, disciplines, scientific 
communities, and the state are ordered.  
In this sense, Lepsius describes the differentiation of a new order analytically 
as cognitive isolation of a value (Lepsius 1990, 35). Firstly, the value is translated 
into “rationality criteria” (such as standards, rules, and procedures) that systemize 
actions and make them predictable and intersubjectively controllable. Secondly, 
the rationality criteria are applied to a specific scope of action. The process of 
institutionalization includes not only the rationalization of a value, but also the 
definition as to when, for whom, and in which contexts it should be applied. 
Thirdly, the new order needs to be established against other contradictory orders, 
e.g. through sanctions (Lepsius 2013, 15). In contrast to the governance perspec-
tive, Lepsius underlines that action is consistently oriented towards an envisioned 
order. This perspective turns attention towards the process of institutionalization 
in which critique plays an essential role – as this study will show.  
3.  Methodology 
How can the profound shift of the German research system towards organiza-
tional competition be explained? In order to understand this process from a 
micro-, meso-, and macro-perspective, I conducted a case study on the merger 
of the University of Karlsruhe and the Research Center Karlsruhe. Discourse 
analytical studies have shown that competition and efficiency have been an 
increasingly important issue in Germany ever since the 1980s. As early as in 
1985, the German Council of Science and Humanities (Wissenschaftsrat) has 
published a recommendation formulating a new role model for the university 
based on quality, efficiency, performance, evaluation, and competition (Wis-
senschaftsrat 1985; Bartz 2007a, 132). Nevertheless, these recommendations 
did not have any institutional effects until the mid-1990s, when the German 
federal states started to reform their state laws and the Council of Science and 
Humanities began to evaluate extra-university research organizations.  
In order to identify the causes for the shift from the institutional logic of 
corporatist planning to the logic of organizational competition, this study re-
traces the history of the KIT merger case. By applying process-tracing as a 
method of qualitative research, we can study how events are causally interrelat-
ed in sequences (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bengtsson and Ruonavaara 2017; 
Aljets and Hoebel 2017; Kern and Laux 2017 in this volume). Sequencing is a 
method that helps to identify chain-linked events. In order to study the se-
quences that led to the KIT merger, it was necessary to trace back the sequenc-
es of different length and “scales of observation” (Desjeux 2008; Aljets and 
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Hoebel 2017). The use of different scales allows studying the nesting of organ-
izational change into broader field change (Gray, Purdy and Ansari 2014). 
Three scales of observation are distinguished: In order to capture the macro-
level of the field, science policy literature and documents were examined. At 
the organizational level of the Research Center Karlsruhe and the University of 
Karlsruhe annual reports and concepts were analyzed as written outcomes of 
the process. To study the individual perceptions and interpretations of the ac-
tors involved, 20 interviews with members of the leadership teams of both 
organizations were conducted (Pruisken 2014, 139-47). The interviews were 
conducted in 2008 and 2009, when the first round of the German Excellence 
Initiative (see below) had already been decided by science policy makers. At 
that time, the merger was in process and the concepts of how to establish and 
structure the new KIT had already been produced. The data was analyzed and 
coded according to two broader categories: critical junctures and critique. 
Organizational mergers are often nested in field change. External “shocks” 
such as social upheaval, technological innovations, scientific discoveries, or 
regulatory change are assumed to destabilize existing practices and rules and 
produce a high degree of uncertainty (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002, 
60). These changes usually enable the entry of new players and “institutional 
entrepreneurs” (Maguire, Hardy and Lawrence 2004). Research on mergers and 
acquisitions has shown that merger waves are often a result of such jolts or 
shocks (Stearns and Allan 1996). This research also indicates a causal relation-
ship between external events, on the one hand, and organizational transfor-
mations (such as mergers), on the other hand. Events can be understood as 
temporal isolable units that can be extracted from societal change due to their 
importance for future developments (Aljets and Hoebel 2017, 8). In this sense, 
Mahoney understands critical junctures as “choice points when a particular 
option is adopted from among two or more alternatives” (Mahoney 2001, 113). 
Critical junctures are structured by open dynamics of conflict in which several 
options can be selected. But, as Mahoney argues, “once a particular option is 
selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point 
when multiple alternatives were still available” (2001, 113). Nevertheless, only 
those choice points should be considered critical junctures “that close off im-
portant future outcomes” (2001, 113). These future outcomes are characterized 
by a high degree of self-reproductivity and path dependency. 
Critical junctures can be understood as a period of unsettled and open dis-
putes that are concerned with the interpretation of the situation. The “recogni-
tion that the concrete particular situation at hand is somehow ambiguous, unset-
tled or unresolved” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 998) is necessary for the 
prevalence of a critical juncture. In this situation principles and schemas from 
the past have to be (re)activated, deliberated, decided and subsequently execut-
ed. Actors thereby rely on “cultural logics of coordination” (Diaz-Bone 2015, 
21) understood as orders of justification (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). This is 
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due to the fact that “justifications have to follow rules of acceptability” 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 1999, 360). Not every argument can be usefully ap-
plied in every social context, but it has to be tested and proved. Therefore an 
already existing and proven frame of analysis has to be tackled by the critic. 
Eventually the arguments given have to be brought into an agreement or com-
promise in order to solve the dispute. A principle of equivalence is needed that 
brings objects, people, and their connections into an order.  
Beside pragmatic critique, critical junctures may also be influenced by ra-
ther projective forms of critique (Emibayer and Mische 1998). Hence, actors do 
not only repeat habits from the past, but also imagine and invent future possi-
bilities through framing and theorization. Alternative solutions for a given 
(criticized) problem are hypothesized. In many cases scientific breakthroughs 
such as nuclear technologies, nano- and biotechnologies have led to a new 
“sociotechnical imaginary” defined as “collectively imagined forms of social 
life and social order reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific 
scientific and/or technological projects” (Jasanoff and Kim 2009, 120). The 
process of relating arguments and making a compromise can be grasped by the 
concept of theorization, by which Strang and Meyer “mean the self-conscious 
development and specification of abstract categories and the formulation of 
patterned relationships such as chains of cause and effects” (Strang and Meyer 
1993, 492). Theorization includes two central features: the specification of 
general organizational failing, on the one hand, and the justification of abstract 
possible solutions, on the other hand (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 2002, 
60). 
4.  Changing Logics in German Academic Science 
4.1  The Institutional Logic of Corporatist Planning (1950s-1980s) 
In this section, two sequences are presented that describe the emergence of an 
institutional logic of corporatist planning. This logic is characterized by a high 
degree of governmental power and authority. However, in Germany this power 
has been traditionally divided between the federal states and the national gov-
ernment (Braun 1997, 26). Over time, a strong institutional boundary between 
universities and research institutes has emerged as an outcome of a political 
conflict between these two autonomous policy levels. Ever since the 1950s, the 
impression that academic science and research are crucial for the national com-
petitiveness and cultural development has increased across all Western nation 
states (Drori et al. 2003, 2). Both the federal states and the national govern-
ments were therefore interested in corroborating their influence and access to 
scientific institutions. Within these negotiation systems, a high degree of trust 
and consensus emerged that led to the formation of four domains of research 
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(“pillarization”): The Max-Planck-Society (and the universities) undertakes 
academic basic research, the Fraunhofer-Society is associated with industrial 
contract research, the Helmholtz Society provides state preventive research, 
and the Leibniz-Society performs thematic research (Hohn 2010, 460).  
The overall idea of this system was a value chain covering the whole range 
from rather accidental academic inventions to technological applications. 
Therefore, the academic identity of individual researchers is not only shaped by 
scientific communities, but also by these specific organizational identities. The 
research styles between the different kinds of research organizations differ 
greatly. In addition, the German model is characterized by a strong focus on 
academic self-governance. The German universities and non-university re-
search organizations were traditionally led by academic committees (e.g. the 
senate) that took all important academic decisions. Nevertheless, academic 
freedom is thought of as freedom in the state, rather than freedom from the 
state. The self-organization of corporate bodies takes place under the jurisdic-
tion and supervision of the state (Braun 1997, 173). Therefore, legal certainty is 
a strong principle in German universities and research organizations. 
Higher Education Expansion (1960s-1980s) 
After World War II, the universities in Germany had to be rebuilt. Although 
this situation held the potential to become a critical juncture, the “old” govern-
ance that existed before 1933 was restored. The cultural sovereignty of the 
federal states as well as the freedom of science were codified in the constitu-
tion. Federalism led to the emergence of two policy levels that had to be coor-
dinated. Until the 1970s, a variety of actors were created for that purpose: the 
Conference of Ministers of Education (KMK) in 1948, the Council of Science 
and Humanities2 in 1957, and the Joint Conference of the National Government 
and the Federal States in 1970 (today: Joint Science Conference). The overall 
aim of these committees was to push forward plans for higher education expan-
sion. 
It is a popular narration that the so-called Sputnik-Shock (1957) – the fact 
that Russian scientists won the first round of the space race –  created the in-
sight that the scientific future cannot be built by a research elite, but needs a 
broader fundament of general education. Although this event hit the US-
American national identity much more than the German one, within a few 
years’ delay, a “national educational catastrophe” was also diagnosed in Ger-
many. The two main proponents in this discourse were Georg Picht and Ralf 
Dahrendorf. Whereas Picht (1964) argued from a more economic perspective 
                                                             
2  The Council of Science and Humanities is an advisory committee giving recommendations 
for the future development of the national science and higher education system. Members 
are scientists, state actors, and public persons. 
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that an educational crisis leads to an economic crisis, Dahrendorf (1965) em-
phasized the sociopolitical aspects of education, claiming for education as a 
civil right. The discussion subsequently initiated a process of institution-
building in which the higher education landscape was transformed in an in-
creasingly orchestrated and planned higher education system.  
Influenced by the Dahrendorf-Plan, all federal states started to design plans 
for their higher education institutions. Different to former attempts at reforming 
the German higher education landscape, not only universities and technical 
schools,3 but also engineering, educational and other seminaries were integrat-
ed into a comprehensive higher education system (Bartz 2007b, 161). The 
Dahrendorf committee also invented the idea of transforming all German uni-
versities into comprehensive higher education colleges (Gesamthochschulen). 
This idea was implemented in some federal states, but could not be fully insti-
tutionalized. Instead, a division of labor between academic universities and 
applied colleges (Fachhochschulen) was implemented. With the First German 
Higher Education Framework Act in 1976, the universities became increasingly 
similar among each other. This Framework Act was mostly organized and 
planned by the Joint Conference of the National Government and the Federal 
States. At that time, the number of students had risen from 85,949 in the winter 
semester 1948/49 to 658,204 in the winter semester 1972/1973 – thus it had 
increased by a factor of nearly 8 (Statistisches Bundesamt). 
In this process, Technische Hochschulen were renamed as “technical univer-
sities.” They integrated basic science as well as social sciences and humanities 
into their programs. In terms of organizational design, the technical universities 
adapted to the traditional universities and incorporated the value of academic 
freedom into their organizational structures: researchers are free to set their 
research lines. Nevertheless, the reason for the academization of the technical 
sciences did not only rest on higher education expansion. In addition, the sub-
stantial and methodological border between natural and technical sciences 
became clearer and the latter was viewed more and more as being a true aca-
                                                             
3  The institutionalization of Technical Universities started with the formation of polytechnical 
schools at the beginning of the 19th century. The Polytechnical School in Karlsruhe was 
founded in 1825. In the course of the growing industrialization, these schools institutional-
ized the idea that natural and engineering sciences should constitute a closed discipline on 
its own (Neumeier 2000, 11). From the beginning, polytechnical schools and universities 
were in conflict with the existing prestigious universities. But already in the middle of the 
19th century, the polytechnical schools began to fight for equality with the universities. 
Engineers should become a profession equivalent to physicians and lawyers (Neumeier 2000, 
16). Subsequently, in 1885, polytechnical schools were renamed “Technische Hochschulen” 
(technical schools or technical higher education institutions). Between 1899 and 1901, the 
technical schools were granted the right to award doctoral degrees, which meant the for-
mal equalization with the universities.  
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demic science.4 Although the technical universities today have the status of 
comprehensive universities, they still consider themselves to be different from 
the traditional universities (Interview 01). Accordingly, even if all universities 
were regarded as equal (but different from the colleges of applied sciences), 
there are still profound boundaries between organizational identities.  
“Big Science” (1950s-1980s) 
Large-scale research as an institutional form of research was initiated through 
the announcement of the “nuclear age.”  
Atoms for peace was the promising slogan, indicating that Western industrial 
nations denying the atomic salvation would be seriously threatening their own 
and the whole West’s economic prosperity. (Gleitsmann 2011, abstract) 
An important element of sociotechnical imaginaries such as nuclear power is 
their projective, salvationist, and utopist (but at the same time secular) charac-
ter – they claim to solve major problems threatening society and prepare for a 
better future. The theorized problem of the pro-nuclear power movement in-
cluded that wealth, growth, and social peace depend on this new technology 
and that otherwise the country would fall back behind other Western “atomic” 
countries (Gleitsmann 2011, abstract). The theorized solution, on the other 
hand, was infused with fictional ideas of how nuclear power could save the 
world.  
With the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1955, the Federal Republic of 
Germany received the sovereignty to conduct nuclear research and operate 
nuclear research centers (Ritter 1992, 61). This “regulatory jolt” led to a pro-
cess of institution-building in the scientific and political field in Germany as 
well as in other countries. This situation could be conceived as a critical junc-
ture because several ways of how to institutionalize nuclear technology, reactor 
development, and atomic energy were discussed between political actors,5 
industrial companies, and academic actors.6 In this rather unsettled and open 
dispute, a variety of new collective actors such as commissions and councils 
were established and assigned to develop an agenda for research and develop-
ment on nuclear energy (Hohn and Schimank 1990, 237-45). 
The outcome of this contingent negotiation process was that initially two 
Nuclear Research Centers were founded; one of them being the Nuclear Re-
search Center in Karlsruhe which is in the focus of this study. In the beginning, 
                                                             
4  This process was underlined by the admission of some individual engineers into the Prussian 
Academy of the Sciences (Federspiel 2011, 28). 
5  The political actors involved were the Federal Chancellery, Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
Federal Ministry of the Economy, and Federal Ministry of Nuclear Power. 
6  The academic actors involved were the scientific community of nuclear scientists, the 
German Research Council, and the German Research Foundation. 
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the research center was funded by a joint venture consisting of different science 
policy actors, industrial companies, and a group of scientists from the Max-
Planck-Institute in Göttingen. Especially the industrial partners supported an 
organizational design based on the model of industrial firms, while, in contrast, 
the scientists opted for an organizational solution that was similar to the Max-
Planck-Institutes (Oetzel 1996, 308). Thus, in the founding years, the Research 
Center was shaped by competing ideas on how to organize research most effec-
tively (Pruisken 2014, 213-7). However, when the representatives of the indus-
try realized that their demands could not be established, they withdrew from 
the joint venture. As a result, the role of the national government which had to 
cover the increasing costs of the center was considerably strengthened. 
During that time (1960s), the term “big science” emerged in order to de-
scribe a specific type of research. Accordingly, large-scale organizations 
should conduct research that was highly relevant for society. This vision was 
mostly promoted by Wolfgang Häfele (project leader of the “Fast Breeder 
Reactor” in Karlsruhe). Having visited national laboratories in the US, he 
clearly distinguished “big science” from the rather conventional project-driven 
type of science at universities (Oetzel 1996, 10; Hohn and Schimank 1990, 
249). Hohn and Schimank highlight three characteristics of big science – un-
derstood as rationality criteria – that were defined during these times: Firstly, 
big science works on research topics that require an extraordinary amount of 
financial, instrumental, and personnel resources for a longer period of time. 
This was symbolized by the large equipment that the researchers worked on.7 
Secondly, big science integrates basic and applied science and covers – within 
the scope of projects – the whole process from basic modeling to technical 
development. Inasmuch as the research organization works on applied research, 
the choice of research topics and priorities is a political decision (Hohn and 
Schimank 1990, 251-2). Big science includes the idea that societal issues and 
problems are solved by big research institutes (or coordinated programs). Until 
the 1970s, big science research organizations were institutionalized in Germany 
as a large domain of the science system (Hohn and Schimank 1990, 254-7). In 
the 1950s, most of them were dedicated to nuclear research. Since the mid-
1960s, the research topics have diversified. Consequently, the scope of action 
(Lepsius) for big science and, therefore, its degree of legitimacy was extended 
to other fields of research. 
4.2  Critique and Critical Junctures (1990s) 
The 1990s are considered the critical years during which new forms of research 
governance were introduced for the first time (Jansen 2010b). In this period, 
                                                             
7  Examples are particle accelerators, nuclear reactors, meteorological stations, or rocket 
launch vehicles. 
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two critical junctures can be identified. Both of them have affected the German 
political system as a whole and the science system more specifically: firstly, 
the nuclear accidents of Harrisburg (1979) and later Chernobyl (1986) and, 
secondly, the German Reunification in 1989/90. 
German Reunification and Change (1990s) 
As early as in 1985, the German Council of Science and Humanities published 
a recommendation in which a new role model for the university based on quality, 
efficiency, performance, evaluation, and competition was formulated (Wissen-
schaftsrat 1985; Bartz 2007a, 132). The Council had realized a potential fall back 
of German universities compared to other nations (Bartz 2007a, 140). However, 
in contrast to other countries (e.g. Great Britain or the Netherlands), these 
recommendations were not followed by any institutional effect. At that time, the 
degree of academic self-governance at German universities was high and aca-
demic associations (German Association of University Professors and Lectur-
ers and German Rector’s Conference) were protecting their rights. In the litera-
ture this was described as a “non-aggression-pact” (Hornbostel 2001, 140).8 
In this situation of institutional inertia, the German reunification forced the 
actors involved to restructure the Eastern German higher education and re-
search system. This event constituted a critical juncture that opened up the 
opportunity to reorganize academic institutions (Mayntz 1994; Pasternack 
2001, 2006). As an outcome of this process, East German organizations (uni-
versities, colleges, and research organizations) were incorporated into the West 
German academic system. The Council of Science and Humanities was en-
gaged to evaluate the non-university research institutes of the German Demo-
cratic Republic (GDR) and to give recommendations concerning their future 
role in the German system. In addition, the Council developed recommenda-
tions for the future structure of higher education in the “new” federal states in 
East Germany (Stucke 2006, 251). These recommendations were highly influ-
ential due to the perceived necessity of change.  
At that time, resistance to reforms and the unwillingness to accept any 
change was increasingly criticized by several heads of universities who de-
nounced the German university as “rotten from the inside?” (Glotz 1996; Si-
mon 1991) or potentially “not savable” (Daxner 1996). The authors viewed the 
huge increase in student numbers and overload of student capacities (as a result 
of higher education expansion) as a problem and described many structural 
problems that the universities faced at that time. The more or less common idea 
was that the state would have to reduce its influence in order to let creativity 
                                                             
8  The introduction of the so-called democratic “group university” could be viewed as an 
institutional logic in itself. It played a major role in the resistance against the reforms, but 
will not be further examined in this paper (see Schimank 1995). 
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and new ideas flow (Glotz 1996, 135) – but a withdrawal of the state from the 
basic funding and function of protecting academic freedom was rather not 
intended (Daxner 1996, 194). Quality assurance, the role of the university in 
the public sphere and the region, transparency, and comparability of perfor-
mance were important topics. In 1994, a neoliberal think tank, the Center for 
Higher Education (CHE), was founded which propagated extensively the mod-
el of the autonomous, competitive, and “unleashed” university.9 
In the following years, the criticism triggered a process of theorization and 
the implementation of a series of reform measures and new regulations. The 
fourth amendment of the German Higher Education Framework Act in 1998 
included the devolution of power from the national government to the federal 
states (Kühler 2005, 266-70) which started to evaluate their higher education 
systems, set up planning commissions, and compiled strategic plans for the 
future.10 These plans and papers dealt with the efficiency of the higher educa-
tion system in the focal national government, e.g. the underutilization of capac-
ities for students and the introduction of NPM-instruments. All federal state 
governments reformed their university law which in most cases led to a reduc-
tion of academic self-governance and increasing power of university presidents 
and university councils (Hüther 2010).  
But more importantly, the Council of Science and Humanities strengthened 
its role as an evaluator of higher education and research. By the end of the 
1990s, the Council was commissioned to conduct so-called system evaluations 
of the Leibniz Society and the Helmholtz Society. In addition, an international 
commission led by Prof. Richard Brook, the Chief Executive of the British 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), also evaluated 
the German Research Foundation and the Max-Planck-Society. Both commis-
sions criticized the low level of cooperation between the different domains of 
extra-university research organizations and universities and recommended more 
competition and cooperation (Hohn 2005, 14). 
Critique of Big Science (1990s) 
The nuclear research centers have also been increasingly criticized ever since 
the 1980s. The nuclear accidents in Harrisburg (1979) and Chernobyl (1986) 
along with the emerging environmental movement condemned research in 
nuclear energy heavily, attacked the projective vision of the “nuclear age,” and 
destroyed the trust in the professional authority of the nuclear research centers 
(Weingart 1979, 15). After years of debate, the national government decided to 
step out of the fast breeder technology in 1991. This decision meant a profound 
break for the Research Center Karlsruhe. Besides, policy makers and especially 
                                                             
9  <http://www.che.de/cms/?getObject=1082&getLang=de> (Accessed August 24, 2017). 
10  <http://www.hof.uni-halle.de/steuerung/struktur.htm> (Accessed August 24, 2017). 
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engineering companies criticized the enormous amount of resources given to 
the big science research institutes. The measure of evaluation, here, was eco-
nomic interest rather than environmental protection (as in the first case). The 
so-called “Weule-Commission,” an expert group of industry representatives set 
up by the Federal Ministry of Research in 1993, recommended to expand the 
level of applied research within the big science institutes up to 70% and includ-
ed the hidden recommendation of closing the nuclear research centers in Jülich 
and Karlsruhe (Helling-Moegen 2009, 102).11 The former president of the 
Research Center Karlsruhe, Manfred Popp, asserted in 2007 that the center was 
attacked from several sides: industrial associations and companies and the press 
were asking 
why the research that is done at the center could not be done at a university, 
why there is no competition between the research centers, and why big science 
besides the Max-Planck-Society and the Fraunhofer-Society should be neces-
sary. (Popp October 22, 2007, own translation) 
This criticism was expressed over a period of several years. It increasingly 
legitimated the initiation of a process of organizational change and reform. 
Firstly, the former Nuclear Center Karlsruhe was renamed in “Research Center 
Karlsruhe” in 1995. The center had to diversify its research topics (For-
schungszentrum Karlsruhe 2006, 65). The new research fields included new 
topics which were developed on the basis of the former nuclear energy re-
search: micro systems technology, nanotechnology, earth and environment, 
meteorology and climate, energy and genetics (Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe 
2006, 98). Secondly, the Helmholtz-Society (HGF) was founded as an associa-
tional umbrella organization that aimed at promoting the common objectives of 
the big science research institutes: pursuing long-term research goals of state 
and society, combining basic research with problem-oriented research, resolv-
ing societally pressing questions, and ensuring the future of society. Thirdly, in 
the late 1990s, the Federal Ministry of Education developed the idea of a com-
petitive program-based funding structure for the Helmholtz Institutes. This 
structure was developed in order to overcome their pillarization and initiate 
competition (Helling-Moegen 2009). The decision as to whether an institute 
gets funded (for a period of five years) in one of the initially eight funding 
schemes is now made by evaluation panels organized by the Helmholtz Society 
(Hohn 2010, 467). 
As a result of this process, the former nuclear research centers became more 
similar to universities and developed intensified research collaborations with 
the latter. Already back in the 1950s, the Technical University of Karlsruhe and 
the Nuclear Research Center had formed ties within the Institute of Nuclear 
Process Technology (Neumeier 2000, 28). In addition, a major part of institute 
                                                             
11  <http://www.bild-der-wissenschaft.de/bdw/bdwlive/heftarchiv/index2.php?object_id=1009 
2084> (Accessed June 30, 2017). 
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leaders were appointed together with the University of Karlsruhe. These insti-
tutional collaborations were extended with the establishment of a collaborative 
Institute for Nanotechnology (INT) in 1998. Many interview partners described 
this cooperation as “path-breaking” for the later establishment of the KIT be-
cause they realized that research can become successful when different re-
search institutes work together (Fenske 2009, 88).  
Within a very short period of time, Karlsruhe reached a leading position in the 
national field of nanotechnology and this shows what can be possible when 
forces are joined, and insofar this might be a good example. (Interview 01, 
own translation) 
Besides that, the joint institute for nanotechnology was organized less hierar-
chically than the other institutes of the Research Center (Interview 03).  
The INT has twelve professors who are all organized in research groups. 
There is not the one big boss of the INT, and they all work together. That is a 
completely different spirit of work. And on the other hand, you cannot say, we 
will do this and that for five years and no one will do anything else. The other 
institutes can do that because they have the boss. (Interview 04, own translation) 
Most interview partners describe the organization of research at the Research 
Center Karlsruhe as more hierarchically structured and filled by a “spirit of 
planning” (Meier 2017). Nevertheless, this had been criticized by different 
scientists also within the Research Center who mostly argue that research is 
somehow difficult to plan (Interview 02). This critique indicates that the organ-
izational identity of “Big Science” was never fully accepted even within the 
Helmholtz institutes, which undermines the logic of corporatist planning. 
4.3  The Institutional Logic of Organizational Competition 
As an outcome of the “unsettled 1990s,” academic self-administration in uni-
versities was reduced and hierarchical management strengthened. The Helm-
holtz institutes were increasingly put under competitive pressure. Thus, the 
reforms were much more guided by an institutional logic of organizational 
competition than the logic of corporatist planning. The orchestration of compe-
tition has been labeled with the term quasi-market (Le Grand 2011, 80). In this 
regard, competition for resources “takes place mostly not on ‘real’ markets but 
on ‘quasimarkets’ where performance evaluations by peers substitute the de-
mand pull from customers” (Boer, Enders and Schimank 2007, 139). The insti-
tutionalization of competition involves the emergence of a normative order that 
defines the rules, participants, and chances to win (Weber 2015 [1922]). This 
normative order includes that universities are increasingly understood as “com-
plete organizations” with a “well-defined identity, a hierarchical structure and 
capacity for rational action” (Seeber et al. 2014, 1450). The organization of 
research collaborations between industry, public research organizations, and 
government agencies is increasingly devoted towards universities “which play 
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an enhanced role in innovation in increasingly knowledge-based societies” 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000, 109) and therefore have a third mission 
(beyond teaching and research). Instead of the state, universities develop new 
research perspectives and organize activities between researchers and the pri-
vate sector.  
With the beginning of the 2000s, world-wide university rankings emerged 
and defined the evaluative criteria for strong research universities. In this con-
text, it became increasingly visible that German universities were not able to 
compete with the American and British research universities (Stanford, Har-
vard, Oxford, Cambridge, etc.) (Gaehtgens 2012, 14). In 2002, the former 
president of the Council of Science and Humanities, Max Einhäupl, claimed 
that “there is no single university that could compete with, for example, Har-
vard or Yale” and concluded that “we need a German Harvard” (Schubert, 
2002, own translations). This perception implied that science policy makers 
turned away from the former egalitarian model of the university that had 
shaped the higher education landscape in Germany for many years 
(Strohschneider 2009). In January 2004, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) 
resolved upon a paper called “Weimarer Leitlinien Innovation” in which it was 
stated that the German higher education system should be changed in order to 
create international top universities able to compete with Harvard or Stanford 
(SPD 2004, 5).  
This paper was the ideational foundation of the German Excellence Initia-
tive which was decided upon in July 2005 by the so-called joint conference of 
the national government and the federal states (Bund-Länder-Konferenz) and 
subsequently implemented by the German Research Foundation and the Coun-
cil of Science and Humanities (Strohschneider 2009, 14). The initiative con-
sisted of three funding lines 1) graduate schools, 2) excellence clusters, and 3) 
a concept for the future. The third funding line addresses (for the first time in 
Germany) organizations and their leadership and not individual researchers or 
research teams. Universities are asked to identify their strength and weakness-
es, develop long-term goals and a concept of how to reach these goals 
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and Wissenschaftsrat 2005). The aim is 
that German universities become internationally visible (in terms of their posi-
tions in international rankings). Therefore, universities should become strategic 
actors that are able and competent to set their long-term goals and compete on 
academic markets (Hasse and Krücken 2013).  
The role model of this new institutional logic is the American Research 
University that seems to be highly successful in the competition for funding 
and students. The entrepreneurial university is seen as a strategic actor manag-
ing the relationship with its environment in a self-autonomous manner. It is 
also considered to be more adaptable to competitive pressures (Clark 1998, 5). 
In many ways, the technical universities resembled the entrepreneurial univer-
sity model more than the traditional comprehensive universities in Germany. 
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Typically, technical universities are characterized by a discipline-specific high-
er level of third party funding in the engineering sciences, a traditionally higher 
degree of collaborations with the industry that leads to the building of start-ups 
in the periphery of the university and a higher acceptance of hierarchical lead-
ership.12 The role model for the entrepreneurial university is the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) that was formed in 1861 as a “science-based 
university committed to the industrial development of the region” (Etzkowitz 
2002, 2). Etzkowitz argues that, at MIT, an entrepreneurial university model 
was developed. It was subsequently transferred to Stanford University and then 
spread throughout the academic world. 
5.  The Formation of KIT (2005-2009) 
The excellence initiative created a competitive situation in which the manage-
ment of the University of Karlsruhe perceived an expectation for change on the 
side of science policy that asked for new ideas, especially in terms of structural 
and organizational change.  
Firstly, there was a call for new ideas and new structures. It was a completely 
new situation in Germany. There is no example for the third funding line. And 
then, of course, the willingness for change, or let's say: the drive to enforce 
changes, this became quite high. (Interview 01, own translation) 
The responsibility to drive organizational and structural changes was thus de-
volved from the political level of science policy makers to the organizational 
level of university managers. The latter viewed this situation as an opportunity 
for the mobilization of resources in which the universities mutually observed 
each other (White 1981, 518). The management of the University of Karlsruhe 
began to evaluate and critically reflect their chances of winning this competi-
tion. They came to the conclusion that it would be difficult to beat other tech-
nical universities that were selected after the first round, such as the Technical 
University of Munich and the Technical University of Aachen.  
The competition was mostly seen with the technical universities, and because 
Aachen and TU Munich were still in the running, the judgement was that it 
would not suffice to win, especially against Aachen. Munich – we thought – 
would be easier to beat.  
The quote shows that the Excellence Initiative has created a situation in which 
the universities had to reflect their strengths and weaknesses in comparison to 
other (comparable) universities. Due to the perception of a high degree of 
                                                             
12  In 2006, the TU9 (“TU 9 German Institutes of Technology e.V.”) was founded, an association 
of the nine big and prestigious Technical Universities in Germany. University of Karlsruhe 
was a founding member of that group. The term “Institute of Technology” is analogous to 
the American Institutes of Technology, e.g. Massachusetts, Georgia, or California. 
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“willingness for change” – that was especially suggested by the third funding 
line and was also enforced through some comments of the reviewers (of the 
preliminary application) – the management was trying to find a “unique selling 
point” (Hartmann 2013, 70) that could convince the evaluators of the Excel-
lence Initiative. In this process of reflection and comparison, the idea of a mer-
ger came up, which had originally been formulated in the course of a review 
process of the Research Center Karlsruhe. The idea to form the KIT thus had 
several sources: the close collaboration with the Research Center Karlsruhe, a 
recommendation of an expert group that had evaluated the research center and 
the role model of the entrepreneurial university per se: the MIT.  
The projective vision of the KIT created some enthusiasm in the manage-
ment team. The idea of “making KIT” inspired the management team because 
it offered the possibility to overcome various problems of the system, notably 
the high degree of “pillarization” between universities and non-university 
research organizations. The temporal orientation towards the future had un-
leashed imaginative capacities and opened-up the opportunity to promote a new 
organizational model for a German university: the KIT “as the dedicated in-
strument to join the league of world-leading technical universities” (Universität 
Karlsruhe 2006). The new model was theorized in the “concept for the future” 
that had to be submitted about two months after the idea of KIT came up. The 
management of the research center was not involved in this process, but sup-
ported it (Interview 02). The KIT has been mostly “theorized” (see above) as a 
solution for the low performance of the German system. The causes identified 
for the low performance are 1) the high degree of dependency of young re-
searchers, 2) the low degree of organizational autonomy, 3) the low percentage 
of women in natural and technical sciences, and 4) the problem of pillarization. 
In order to overcome these weaknesses, a bundle of measures and instruments 
were suggested, including a new organizational structure for research which 
was designed to organize the merger with the research center. 
These research matrices are the basis for the new research oriented organiza-
tional structures as opposed to the current departments which are responsible 
for undergraduate teaching and consecutive bachelor-master programs. The 
integration of research at our university and research at the FZK (the latter be-
ing organized in research programs) is accomplished in the frame of these re-
search matrices. (Universität Karlsruhe 2006, 2) 
The new research structure has been inspired by the idea of inter- and transdis-
ciplinarity – a core issue in the mode 1 and mode 2 debate (Gibbons et al. 
1994). The existing disciplinary boundaries were dissolved (in terms of re-
search activities, not for teaching). In addition, the establishment of new joint 
research institutes was planned. Similar to other German universities participat-
ing in the Excellence Initiative, the university started a process of building 
“profiles” and defining core areas of research (Meier and Schimank 2010).  
In October 2005, it turned out that the University of Karlsruhe had won the 
competition. In the following step, the negotiation process for the merger start-
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ed. The temporal orientation now switched into the pragmatic mode of action: 
Many veto players were involved (federal ministry, ministry of Baden-
Württemberg, Helmholtz Society, and both merging organizations) who had to 
find a way to make this merger work and to reorder the competencies that were 
formerly structured by the “old logic” of corporatist planning. Resistance 
against the merger thus did not come from the professors and researchers of 
both organizations, but from political actors involved: 
There were attempts to stop the whole process, also from the highest level, but 
it was too late. And because the non-German evaluators in particular said, do 
it, this is good. And gradually, the opinion changed. So… resistance was mas-
sive, not so much from the federal state, but from the national government. 
Resistance is not the right expression. This was war, also with the Helmholtz 
Society […]. (Interview 02, own translation) 
The outcome of this first negotiation phase was a position paper written by the 
university management and the research center. The Helmholtz Society and the 
ministries were also involved. Briefly summarized, the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (the major funder of the Research Center) claimed that 
the identity of the Research Center with a strong focus on energy research 
should be strengthened in the newly founded KIT-structure. In the following 
months, a new concept for the KIT was developed. A parallel organizational 
structure was set up in order to formulate a concept that built a compromise 
between the two research types (program-based big science and university 
research). The major difference between both categories was the degree of 
freedom that researchers have in terms of choosing a research line: 
… the president, sure, he is the president of the university, but he does not re-
ally have a say because he has nothing to distribute […]. The 170 professors 
over there, or 150, are fully free people. The Research Center, on the other 
hand has a lot more resources, no doubt, notably more professors and perma-
nent employees. They are good scientists, a good research infrastructure, but 
the research center works on five-years-plans […]. That means we have to 
make a plan for five years […], and we are in competition with other such 
plans within the Helmholtz Society. (Interview 02) 
Therefore, the concept team developed three types of research structures that 
were added to the already existing department and chairs (on the side of the 
university) and the institutes and programs (on the side of the research center): 
“competence portfolio,” “centers,” and “focuses” (Pruisken 2014, chapter 
7.3.3) (Table 1). 
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Table 1: New Research Structures at the KIT 
 Competence Portfolio Centers Focuses 
Governance Academic self-governance: 
Voluntary participation 
Spokesperson is elected 
Top-down planning: 
Topics selected by 
management 
Top-down planning: 
Topics selected by 
management 
Funding Start-up-funds for new 
projects (based on research 
proposals by individual 
researchers and intra-
organizational peer review) 
Existing projects are 
assigned to the center
Start-up-funds for 
new projects 
(selection is based on 
organizations 
interests) 
Bureaucratic structure
Existing projects are 
assigned to the center 
Start-up-funds for 
new projects 
(selection is based on 
organizations 
interests) 
Bureaucratic structure 
Temporal 
orientation 
Short-term Long-term (ten years 
or more) 
Mid-term (five to ten 
years) 
Size Depends on voluntary 
participation of researchers
Big, 200 to 800 
members 
Smaller than the 
centers 
Source: Own compilation, based on documents and interviews. 
 
The “competence portfolio” reflects the identity of the university, whereas the 
“centers” and “focuses” mirror the identity of big science and the Helmholtz 
Society. However, the existing research structures (departments, institutes, and 
programs) were not removed. Mahoney and Thelen (2010, 20) describe this 
kind of institutional change as layering which results when powerful veto play-
ers “protect the old institutions, but they cannot necessarily prevent the new 
ones.” This is also due to the high degree of legal institutionalization of both 
organizations. The newly founded KIT is a complex structure that includes an 
appropriate legal act which had to be designed within the process. The problem 
of pillarization now shifts to the organizational level. The KIT has to balance 
the plural claims and expectations of the Helmholtz Society, the national gov-
ernment, the government of the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, and sev-
eral funding agencies (as well as the students and the civil society). To this end, 
the administrative management structures of the organization are strengthened. 
In the merger process, the KIT is constructed as an organizational actor with a 
mission and goals, formalized structures, and the overall aim to strengthen 
cooperation between the different domains of the German science system.13 
                                                             
13  This goal is even codified in the KIT legal act: <http://www.landesrecht-bw.de/jportal/? 
quelle=jlink&query=KITG+BW&psml=bsbawueprod.psml&max=true> (Accessed September 
8, 2017). 
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6.  Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to show how changing institutional logics led to the 
formation of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, a merger of the University 
of Karlsruhe and the Research Center Karlsruhe. After World War II, the insti-
tutional logic of corporatist planning emerged. In order to strengthen the Ger-
man higher education and science system in an international comparison, nego-
tiation systems (Council of Science and Humanities, Bund-Länderkommission) 
were founded to plan the organization of higher education expansion and re-
search. In the next step, German Reunification involved a restructuring of the 
German higher education and science landscape. Although the process of reu-
nification itself did not lead to reforms, the Council of Science and Humanities 
in its evaluative function and evaluations as a tool in itself were enforced. In 
addition, the critical discourse in the 1990s provided new evaluative criteria for 
governance reforms. The focus shifted towards universities that were seen 
increasingly in competition with each other. Therefore, performance and quali-
ty criteria were discussed that reflect the differences between universities. By 
the end of the 1990s, the German federal states reformed their laws and 
strengthened hierarchical management at the universities.  
With the decline of nuclear research and the demise of the Fast-Breeder-
Technology, the Nuclear Center Karlsruhe faced a crisis that led to an align-
ment of the Research Center and to closer collaboration with the University of 
Karlsruhe. The “Big-Science” research institutes responded to the critique and 
founded the Helmholtz Society. In addition, the system evaluations that were 
performed by the Council of Science and Humanities led to a restructuring of 
the funding structures within the Helmholtz Society and aimed at expanding 
competitive structures between the research institutes. Finally, based on a joint 
initiative of the German Research Foundation and the Council of Science and 
Humanities, the Excellence Initiative created a situation of organizational com-
petition in which the universities observed each other mutually.  
Within this competitive environment, the management of both the Universi-
ty of Karlsruhe and the Research Center Karlsruhe gave rise to the idea of the 
KIT. This organizational transformation can be explained by the preceding 
sequences: a strong critique of the Research Center, an increasing alignment of 
both organizations, the role model of the entrepreneurial university, and claims to 
overcome the high segmentation of the system. After Karlsruhe had become one 
of the winners of the Excellence Initiative, action shifted from a projective mode 
of theorization to a pragmatic mode of negotiation and conflict. The new organ-
ization had to balance the claims of various actors involved because the “old” 
logic of corporatist planning was still institutionalized; especially the national 
government and the Helmholtz Society did not want to lose their influence. 
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The emergence of a new institutional logic is a dynamic process in which 
critique plays an important role. In the projective mode of critique rationality 
criteria for a new order are formulated by relating specific problems and solu-
tions. In the merger case of the KIT, a high degree of pillarization and state 
control was criticized. The new model of the American Research University 
was presented as a solution. The role model of the entrepreneurial university 
performs basic and applied research in one organization. It also competes for 
funding with other entrepreneurial universities. Following this model, the KIT 
embraces different former research types in one organization. Management 
structures are set up in order to coordinate and intensify cooperation between 
research groups. The rules of acceptability for the new model have to be tested 
and proven in the pragmatic mode of critique. As suggested by Boltanski and 
Thevenot, the result is a compromise which is (in this case) characterized by 
layering (Mahoney and Thelen 2010) because old and new organizational 
elements prevail. 
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